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Abstract
This paper examines how the market performs in the presence of dealers during times
that predominately reect stressful market conditions. It examines this issue on the
Nasdaq around unpredictable news events, i.e. the analyst recommendation changes.
The sample period is 2004 at times where Nasdaq dealers were less constrained by reg-
ulation, and were actively providing liquidity on the system. The ndings suggest that
environments where dealers have aliation with the analyst issuing the recommenda-
tion seem to perform particularly better as opposed to environments where they may
not be. The results show narrower spreads, more trades and a more two-sided market
when the report is issued by aliated analysts, but a higher price volatility shortly
before the release of the report. These results have important policy implications be-
cause they support the claim of market regulators. That is, there is an improvement
in liquidity in the presence of informed dealers, as buyers and sellers are both in the
market. This fact signals liquidity creation, and translates to more market stability in
the period leading to the report release.
JEL classication: G1, G2.
Corresponding author: Durham University, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, England. Tele-
phone:+44 (0) 191 3345460, e-mail:arze.karam@durham.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Market liquidity is increasingly the focus among regulators and investors, and rec-
ognized as potential systemic risk. The current regulatory changes imposed by the
Dodd-Frank and Basel III Accords have been initiated to reduce systemic risk in terms
of strengthening the balance sheets and funding models of dealers1. Although the regu-
lation has made the system less levered, it has also led to a reduction of market making
by dealer banks causing some loss of market liquidity in the secondary markets, as
explained by Due (2017). The fact that dealers are now subject to new regulations
has signicantly lowered their ability to continue providing market making services.
Without the dealers smoothing trading, certain markets have seen extreme short-lived
price disruptions accompanied by large order imbalances and evaporation of liquidity
to the point of crash.
There are now growing concerns regarding the reduced capacity of dealers 2 to pro-
vide liquidity and signs of increasing fragility in the market 3 4. There is even initiative
by the CFTC Chairman Christopher Giancarlo in March 2017 to reduce regulatory
burdens on dealers5. Market authorities and lawmakers argue that today's markets
became fragile and unstable driven by structural imbalance in the ratio of the liquidity
provided and liquidity demanded to the markets, and no longer seem to have built-in
liquidity shock absorbers. They claim that the markets would be stable if dealers were
providing continuous order ow during times of market stress 6.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand how the market performs in the presence
1The initiatives are aimed to reduce the probability of banks becoming source of illiquidity conta-
gion, and protect from market abuse. In the United States, the trading requirement is implemented
as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In Europe, it is implemented by the European Commission.
2Dealers and market makers are used interchangeably.
3Mark Carney, speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, 2014 Monetary Authority of
Singapore Lecture.
4Jerome H. Powell, the Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Making
markets Fair and Eective for all", January 20, 2015.
5Speaking at the FIAs International Futures Industry Conference the day after President Trump
nominated him to serve as chairman of the CFTC, acting chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo announced
a new, forward-looking agenda for the regulator focused on fostering economic growth, enhancing US
nancial markets and right-sizing its regulatory footprint. He introduced a new initiative aimed at
reducing regulatory burdens: Project Kiss Keep It Simple Stupid.
6Mary L. Shapiro, speech by the SEC Chairman, "`Strengthening our equity market structure"',
Economic Club of New York, September 7, 2010.
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of dealers over time periods that predominately reect stressful market conditions. I
evaluate this issue on the Nasdaq market circa 2004. Back then, Nasdaq dealers were less
constrained by regulations as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) deregulated
the minimum capital requirements for dealer banks freeing leverage from regulatory
constraints. This enabled dealers to maintain a large market presence, see (Due,
2010). In the particular case of the Nasdaq, they were actively providing liquidity
on the system (Karam, 2017). Like on any other dealer-based market, dealers on the
Nasdaq acquired a certain market skill in stocks they choose to follow, see Schultz
(2003). I explore liquidity and trading activity in the presence of these dealers in the
market across a sample of stocks, around events that may create crowded exist, e.g.
analyst recommendation changes. These news events are valuable to investors as shown
by Womack (1996), are also exhibited with information asymmetry in the market and
are associated with higher trading activity and higher price volatility, as shown by
Irvine et al. (2007). Unlike scheduled announcements, the market may not prepared for
these events. Consequently, investors might be unwilling to trade and liquidity might
evaporate.
I consider two types of events: (i) the recommendation changes of aliated analysts
to market makers and, (ii) the recommendation changes of non-trading analysts (with
no aliation to market makers). I consider the case for dealers with aliated analysts
who are indeed informed (Schultz, 2003; Madureira and Underwood, 2008), and the dif-
ference in information which dierentiates them from other dealers (the non-aliated).
I examine whether the market performs particularly better at times when information
sharing among dealers is more important (the case of aliation). Consistent with the
notion that the forthcoming analyst report generates trading, environments where deal-
ers have access to information from their analyst might increase their market making
capacity at times of one-directional order ow. As a result, a two-sided market with
narrower spreads might occur. I use the dierence-in-dierences to measure execution
costs, price volatility, trading volume and Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) quote-sidedness
for a sample of Nasdaq stocks over the two-hours before an event where the informa-
tion is coming from an aliated analyst as opposed to times where the information is
coming from a non-trading analyst (with no aliation with any market makers).
The analysis across 155 NASDAQ stocks shows that trading environments where
dealers have aliation with the analyst issuing the recommendation seem indeed to
perform better as opposed to environments where they may not be. Findings suggest
narrower inside spreads, more trades when the report is issued by aliated analysts but
higher price volatility shortly before the release of the report. Results suggest further
that environments where aliation exists appear to be signicantly more two-sided.
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The implication is that there is an improvement in liquidity in the presence of aliated
dealers as buyers and sellers are both in the market, and this fact signals liquidity
creation in the period leading to the report release. The signicance of all these results
above does not depend on whether the non-news days or earnings announcements are
used as the control sample in the dierence-in-dierences analysis.
In addition to the implications of this study to the current policy debate, it adds
evidence to the literature on whether intraday news ow has an impact on market
performance in the presence of dealers in the market. The theoretical literature in
market microstructure expects news events to impact price setting of dealers, and this
in turn aects the liquidity of the market, see for instance Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
for the case of symmetrically uninformed dealers and Calcagno and Lovo (2006) for
the case of asymmetrically informed dealers. Because news events are hampered with
uncertainty about the asset value, this magnies information asymmetry among market
participants, which increases informed prots and thus decreases the liquidity supplied
by dealers (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Few empirical studies examine the intraday news
eects on trading activity and market liquidity, whether scheduled or unscheduled news
(Ranaldo, 2008). Under these circumstances, prices become more responsive to supply
shocks and hence liquidity might evaporate in a very short period of time. Maintaining
a liquid market consists of reducing the uncertainty about the asset value and this
requires dealers with sucient risk bearing capacity to be able to process the news
quickly in order to meet unexpected demands. Consistent with this view, environments
where dealers have access to their analyst report appear to be less aected by the
uncertainty around news events, and this translates to more market stability in the
period leading to the report release.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
I collect recommendation changes from the Institutional Brokerage Estimates System
(I/B/E/S) les for NASDAQ listed rms during the period from June 1st, 2004 to De-
cember 31, 2004. I collect also earning announcements for the sample stocks that I use
to check the robustness of the results. The sample for the study is constructed by rst
selecting Nasdaq stocks for which both the date and the timing of the recommendations
are available. Each observation in the database I/B/E/S represents a recommendation
by a brokerage rm or individual analyst. I classify these recommendation changes into
upgrades, downgrades or reiterations (no changes). I do not take into consideration the
level of changes in the classication of recommendation. Most recommendations in the
sample occur in the morning hours.
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Data for companies are collected from the CRSP and the Nastraq database. The
latter reports the best inside quotations in its inside le that I use to measure execution
costs and price volatility. Volume is extracted from Nastraq trade les. To purge the
Nastraq data of potential errors, I delete trades and quotations for which: (1) The trade
price is zero or missing; (2) The quote is missing or negative; (3) The quoted bid-ask
spread is negative; (4) The quoted bid or ask size is negative; (5) The trade and quote
price is outside the regular hours. CRSP and Nastraq data need to be available for
the stocks to be included in the nal sample. This yields 155 stocks. Table 1 shows
descriptive statistics for the 155 sample stocks. As shown in the table, the stocks in
the sample tend to be large, with an average capitalization of $5.90 billion, and more
than 75% of the sample are large in size ($4.39 billion). This may be explained by the
fact that the sample is restricted to rms with analyst recommendation changes. These
rms tend to be large and thus more followed by nancial analysts. Daily share volume
averages about 3.5 million shares, with a median about 1 million shares. Most stocks
in the sample attract a relatively large number of market makers. On average, there
are about 57 market makers active and the median number of active market makers is
55.
I use the market maker ID from NASTRAQ quote le in the matching with the
I/B/E/S analyst code. This allows me to recognize the brokerage rms that can pro-
vide research coverage and market making for every Nasdaq stock in the sample. I
identify the dealers with analyst aliation, and divide the sample into recommenda-
tion changes coming from aliated analysts to dealers, to the ones coming from a
non-trading analyst.
3 Dierence-in-dierences analysis
In general, during unpredictable news events, one usually observes higher trading activ-
ity, higher trading volume, and increased volatility exposing market makers to a greater
risk of holding undiversied portfolio. In response, market makers widen the bid-ask
spreads, resulting in less liquidity available to meet client's demand. As market makers
become more certain about the value of the asset, they will be more likely to provide
liquidity and this leads to narrower spreads, as in Copeland and Galai (1983). Thus,
they will be more likely to meet unexpected demands. In that sense, Madureira and Un-
derwood (2008) document that Nasdaq market makers who have access to information
generated by their nancial analysts face less of an adverse selection problem. I test
whether several standard measures of liquidity and trading activity improve in the case
of aliation. In what follows, I empirically compare market variables for each stock
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in the cases the change in recommendation is coming from an aliated analyst to a
Nasdaq market maker to an event where the information is coming from a non-trading
analyst. I use the dierence-in-dierences analysis to make this comparison. These
strategies are panel data methods applied to sets of variables means in the case that
some are in the aliation sample and others are not (as a control sample). Thus, the
aliation is the cause variable of interest. The use of the same stocks is very important
for identication to estimate what would have happened in the variable when aliation
changes. I describe the methodology for the market inside spread rst, and then discuss
the results for all the variables measuring market performance used in the study.
Spreadi;t = 1Changest+2Affiliationi;t+3Affiliationi;t Changest+i+ t+ i;t
(1)
Where Spread is the inside spread of stock i computed from the NBBO le (inside
le) during the half-hour period that starts at time t ; refer to the latter period as \inter-
val t". t is a time-specic xed eect and i is a stock-specic xed eect. I consider
the inside spreads of a given stock in the aliation sample (Aliation=1) before the
news coming from the aliated analyst and non-aliation sample (Aliation =0) be-
fore the news coming from a non-trading analyst, two hours prior to the announcement
(Changes=1) and 20 days before the event period non-news events (Changes= 0). The
eect of aliation 3 is then obtained by:
DID = 3 =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(E[Spread=Changes = 1; Affiliation = 1]
 
E[Spread=Changes = 0; Affiliation = 1])
 
(E[Spread=Changes = 1; Affiliation = 0]
 
E[Spread=Changes = 0; Affiliation = 0])
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(2)
3 is the estimator which is called the dierence-in-dierences estimator, since one
estimate the time dierence for the aliation and non-aliation groups and then takes
the dierence. Note that the dierencing step eliminates the xed eect i and the
drift t. The model so far ignored the possibility that there remain observable dier-
ences in the factors that aect the spread on the day of the announcement and those of
the day before the announcement. Then such dierences must be controlled for. The
standard solution is to include such controlling variables in the regression. I use the
following variables dened by the literature that aect the inside spreads: the share
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price volatility, the trade size and the share price itself, since it is well known that the
inside spread is related positively to the price volatility and negatively to the trade
size and share price. I include in the regression additional explanatory variables: the
number of analyst following the stocks and the number of market makers, in order to
control for the degree of competition across stocks. Note that the control variables are
not orthogonalized. For example, the number of market makers and the number of an-
alysts are correlated. Since they will not aect the dierence-in-dierences coecient,
I prefer to focus on the Aliation*Changes dummy. The model is then presented in
equation (3):
Spreadi;t = 1Changest + 2Affiliationi;t + 3Affiliationi;t  Changest + 4tradesizei;t
+5pricei;t + 6voli;t + 7mmcnt+ 8No:analyst+
4X
j=1
JDJ +
12X
h=1
hHh + i;t
(3)
Where Tradesize is the log of the trade size of stock i in \interval t". Price is the
log of the mid-point of the bid ask quotations of stock i in \interval t"; vol is the share
price volatility in interval t, and provides a measure of the risk faced by market makers
when trading stock i ; mmcnt is the number of daily market makers following the stock.
No.analyst is the number of analysts following a stock during the whole period of the
study. Since the error terms will vary across the stocks, the model is estimated as a
xed panel model, in which case the rm specic residual may be a dummy variable.
Moreover, in order to capture any deterministic component in the intraday dynamics
of the spread, I control for the time of the day eect; the rst \interval t" starts at 9:30
AM and the last ends at 4:00 PM, which produces 13 intervals per day. I use the last
quote prior to the opening of the trading day as the rst quote of the day, in order to
compute the time-weighted spread of the rst quote. Equation (3) includes dummies
for each day of the week, Dj, in the sample.
3.1 Bid/Ask spreads
I measure the excess announcement trading costs by the inside quoted and eective
spreads when there is aliation. I estimate the parameters from Equation (2).
Table 2 shows a statistically signicant change in the mean inside spread, represented
by the Aliation*Changes dummy coecient. The excess of inside spread prior to the
announcement is lower than normal (-4.580) when there is aliation, suggesting that
the environment of aliation oers lower transaction costs in the period leading to the
announcement. I replicate the analysis by measuring the spread one hour before the
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announcement instead of two hours. The results are quite similar. The Changes variable
used in the regression separated dates on which there was a recommendation change
from those on which there was no announcement. As a robustness check, the same study
is replicated, where the variable Changes takes the value of zero on earnings days and
the value of one on days of recommendation changes, as before. With this new Changes
variable, the same regression equation (2) is estimated. If the Aliation*Changes turns
out to be signicant once again, then it provides further support that its signicance
does not depend on two dierent types of events (news and non-news days) being
used in the regression. Most of the earning announcements in the sample are made in
the afternoon. Unreported results are quite similar to the previous ones. Transactions
costs are lower when aliation exists as coecients are signicant. Taken together with
the earlier ones, the results suggest that at times where there is information sharing
between market makers and their nancial analysts, market liquidity increases, i.e.
lower transaction costs.
3.2 Price volatility, number of trades and market sidedness
Historical returns are now going to be utilized in order to measure the implications on
stock return volatility. As in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), the sum of squared returns
(one-minute) over thirty minutes is computed, each return taken over a one-minute time
interval, both during the two hours and during the control sample preceding the news
release. Returns during the two hours preceding the news are very important for the
purpose of the study, because critical information concerning the trade process and the
impact of dealers' behavior needs to be taken into account. The midpoint quotations
are used to obtain returns of each stock i over the one-minute interval mentioned above.
One minute returns, squared, are summed over thirty minutes and the sum is used for
obtaining an estimate of volatility. A concern with volatility is that large returns tend to
cluster together followed by periods of relatively small returns (GARCH eects). This
suggests that volatility is a temporally dependent (heteroskedastic) variable. There-
fore, the volatility calculated as previously is likely to exhibit serial correlation. Since
returns used in this study are computed using the midquote prices, any existing corre-
lation would not come as a result of bid-ask bounce. In order to take into account the
correlation, a separate equation for volatility is used in the regression which includes
autoregressive terms (GARCH equation). I use the trading volume and the spread
as control variables. The literature suggests that there is a positive linkage between
transaction costs and price volatility. The theoretical support is that the informational
arrival has the eect of widening the bid ask spreads and this induces an increase in
volatility. This eect impacts prices, which become more volatile, since price changes
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are in response to information ow. In Table 3, results show that the pre-announcement
price volatility is signicantly higher two hours before the news release compared to an
hour of a non-announcement day. The coecient of the interaction term is generally
less signicant but positive. For sensitivity analysis, I examine another measure of
intraday volatility, i.e. the average volatility. The results are qualitatively the same.
Further results in Table 3 suggest that the aliation is associated with a signicantly
higher number of trades. The pre-announcement increase in the number of trades might
partially explain the reduction in the spread in the aliation sample documented earlier.
The price volatility increase simply reects information ows given the pre-disclosure
period has been a period of large revelation. Another plausible reason is that it might
result from order arrivals coming on both sides of the market. To investigate this
idea further, I use the market sidedness measure introduced by Sarkar and Schwartz
(2009). It consists on computing the correlation between the number of seller-initiated
trades and buyer-initiated trades in each interval. If the correlation is higher, this
implies that the market is two-sided as a result of order arrivals at both sides of the
market for the aliation sample. Otherwise, the market is one-sided if the correlation
is negative, suggesting that the arrival is more buy-triggered (sell) trades in the interval
and accompanied by the arrival of fewer sell-triggered (buy) trades in the same interval.
Results on the sidedness in Table 3 suggest that the market is more two-sided when
aliation exists: the correlation between the number of seller-initiated trades and the
number of buyer-initiated trades is higher for the aliation sample, which signals the
creation of liquidity in the presence of aliated market makers.
4 Discussion
The present empirical results focus on a specic period where Nasdaq dealers were less
constrained by regulations and were maintaining market presence. The sample period
used is 2004 at time where dealers were actively providing liquidity in Nasdaq listed
rms on the Nasdaq system. Results here suggest that dealers with aliation seem
to be particularly bound to keep providing liquidity in stressed markets environments,
specically when they have access to their analyst report. While other factors are behind
the reduction in market liquidity to today's equity markets, such as drastic structural
changes and the implementation of the RegNMS since 2008, one can conjecture that
the reduced market making by dealers caused by the new regulations does seem to
aggravate the shocks to the markets during periods of market stress.
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Table 1 { Descriptive statistics of stocks sample { The table presents descriptive statistics for
the 155 sample stocks during the period from June 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. Market capitaliza-
tion is computed as the mean daily market capitalization during the sample period using Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data. Price per share is the mean of CRSP closing price during
the sample period. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns during the sample period.
Daily returns are computed from CRSP. Daily share volume is the daily mean share volume during
the sample period using NASTRAD trade le. Proportional inside spread is the time-weighted mean
inside half-spread during the sample period. Number of market makers is dened as the number of
market makers who are active in a stock. Number of nancial analysts is the number of nancial
analysts who are following a stock.
Quartile
Variable Mean Std Deviation 25% 50% 75%
(median)
Market Capitalization (in $ billions) 5.90 16.03 0.73 1.83 4.39
Price per share (in $) 22.28 18.95 7.4 18.77 31.73
Volatility (in %) 2.86 1.16 2 2.65 3.54
Daily share volume (in shares) 3 586 530 9 070 623 465 405 1 058 659 2 794 922
Proportional inside spread 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.14
Number of market makers 57.35 18.26 43 55 70
Number of nancial analysts 15.25 7.37 2 16 35
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Table 2 - Inside spreads prior to news' events - Time-weighted spreads, eective and quoted,
in an interval of thirty minutes, is regressed on constant and dummy variables in both periods: the
rst dummy variable, Changes, is set to one on the two hours before the announcement and 0 on
hours of non-announcement days. The second dummy variable, Aliation, equals one in the cases the
observation belongs to the aliation sample and zero otherwise Zero in both cases. The third dummy
variable is used by multiplication (the interaction term) of the variables Changes and Aliation. Con-
trol factors added to the regression are: price volatility, size of the trade, the price per share. There
are recommendation changes for 155 stocks in the sample: 56% of recommendations are coming from
non-trading analysts and 43% are done by aliated analysts to market makers. Other control variables
included in the regression also are the time of the day and day of the week eects; coecients are not
reported for brevity. The number in parentheses is the average standard error. The standard errors
are corrected for contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity. Boldface indicates signicance.
Variable Qspread Espread
Constant 16.003 16.351
(8.682) (13.765)
Changes 4.73 3.111
(1.181) (1.873)
Aliation -5.198 -3.456
(1.67) (2.648)
Aliation*Changes -4.58 -4.457
(1.181) (2.469)
Price -0.297 -1.1
(0.109) (0.174)
Volatility -0.006 0.44
(0.002) (0.003)
R-squared 0.14 0.40
No. of observations 11 647 855 11 647 855
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Table 3 - Price volatility, number of trades and quote-sidedness prior to news' events.
This Table presents results on price volatility, volume and quote-sidedness two hours prior to the
release of the recommendation changes with Aliation =1 is compared to the one corresponding to
observations with Aliation =0. There are recommendation changes for 155 stocks in the sample: 56%
of recommendations are coming from non-trading analysts and 43% are done by aliated analysts to
market makers. Other control variables included in the regression also are the time of the day and the
xed eects; coecients are not reported for brevity. The standard errors in parentheses are corrected
for contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity. Boldface indicates signicance.
Variable Volatility Ntrades Sidedness
Constant 0.102 0.531 -0.089
(0.102) (0.099) (0.058)
Changes -0.044 -0.501 -0.041
(0.029) (0.028) (0.022)
Aliation 0.141 0.142 0.014
(0.041) (0.04) (0.022)
Aliation*Changes 0.079 0.038 0.065
(0.038) (0.037) (0.026)
Spread 0.116
(0.009)
Trade Size 0.004
(0.009)
R-squared 0.10 0.15 0.08
No. of observations 11 647 855 11 647 855 11 647 855
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